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c. School of Business, State University of New York, Oswego, NY, 13126, USA
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Abstract: In this paper, we study designing and managing effective dual-channel supply chain network equilibrium model to
optimize the profit of each node in dual-channel supply chain network and satisfy seamlessly customer demand. The
customer demand in each channel is driven by the heterogeneous consumer characteristic attributes. In our proposed model,
Multinomial Logit (MNL) function is used to make a purchase decision for customers considering selling price, operation
time and retail services. Furthermore, the Variational Inequality is used to express the equilibrium solution in dual-channel
supply chain network. A numerical example in dual-channel supply chain network is presented to show the MNL function
can be a good replacement for the demand function when customers are heterogeneous and the proposed model can be
helpful to avoid time trap.

Keywords: Dual-channel supply chain network, Network Equilibrium Model, Variational Inequalities, Modified Projection
Method

1. INTRODUCTION
Avoiding loss affected by “channel conflict” in dual-channel supply chain (SC) and dual-channel supply
chain network (SCN) is challenging for firms who need to optimize selling price, processing time and service in
dual-channel markets with heterogeneous consumer characteristic attributes. The operations of dual-channel
SCN not only affect people’s lives, but also the firms’ profitability in SCN. Some manufacturers even have
switched into single-channel SC from dual-channel SC in order to avoid this kind of channel conflict [1], while
others have tried to implement differentiation strategy in dual-channel SC.
Dual-channel SC has increasingly attracted interest in recent literature. Pricing strategy in dual-channel SC
is one of the key issues that previous research focus on. Considering channel control, Chiang et al.[2] construct a
price-setting game between a manufacturer and its independent retailer. Chun and Kim[3] analyze the price
differences between a retailer channel and a direct online channel. Chen et al.[4] examine a manufacturer’s
pricing strategies in a dual-channel SC and illustrate how a contract enables both the manufacturer and the
retailer to be a win-win. Moreover, pricing strategies model of dual-channel SC has been developed for various
characteristics and types SC, including risk management[5], retail service[6], price discounts[7], brand
management[8], information sharing[9], inventory management[10], lead time management[11],[12], and quality
management[13]. However, the aforementioned papers just considered the pricing issue and did not address the
importance of customer choice based on the heterogeneous characteristic attributes. In our model, different
choices from heterogenous customers in the characteristics of products is the driving force of forming
dual-channel SC.
As noted in Nagurney et al.[14], time plays a critical role in time-sensitive products SC. Time is a
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fundamental element in dual-channel SC which customers care. In many papers, operation time is an significant
factor that impact product quality[15],[16], waste of products[17] and lost value[18]. These studies focused on the
importance of operation time in SC and the benefit followed operation time control. For the various type of
products in our model, customers care different operation time combinations, including production time,
delivery time and retail time in practice.
Our study builds upon earlier SCN equilibrium research and makes some new contributions. First, we
develop a network equilibrium model for dual-channel SCN. On the one hand, because most of the models
focused on intra-SC competition, there is little work that studies the competition among dual-channel SCs. On
the other hand, competition is no longer between stand-alone companies, but rather SC against SC[19]. The
strategies in a dual-channel SC were impacted by competing and cooperating SC. Second, selling prices,
operation time and retail service are used as the key characteristics of products in dual-channel SCN. Consumer
choices on selling price, operation time and retail service are driven by the consumer characteristic attributes.
By accounting for consumer-driven time and service competition, we can address a deeper understanding of
time and service competition in dual-channel SCN, which allows managers to evaluate the time and service
competition decision from consumer’s perspective in dual-channel SCN and implement a discrete choice model
to support their decentralized decisions. Next, ignoring consumers’ preferences and needs, Stalk and Webber [20]
reported many firms found themselves caught in a time trap. MNL function, as a discrete choice model, is
developed to understand consumer purchase decisions among selling price, operation time and retail service
based on the consumer characteristic attributes in dual-channel SCN. Finally, shoes were used as a
representative example in dual-channel SCN.
2. DUAL-CHANNEL SCN EQUILIBRIUM MODEL
In this section, we develop a dual-channel SC network equilibrium model for manufacturers, retailers and
customers in markets including the costs associated with the production, transportation, marketing, storage, and
retail service. The decision-makers in the SCN, specifically the manufacturers and retailers, are assumed to seek
profit maximization considering the operation time and retail service. In view of consumer characteristic
attributes among price time and retail service, the consumers in the market make their own decisions in
accordance with their preference and utility. A typical dual-channel SC structure is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. A typical dual-channel SC structure.

More than two dual-channel SCs form a dual-channel SCN. We designate
typical manufacturer is called
market is called
to retailer

who transports its products to

demand markets by direct channel, a typical

(Figure 2). In the traditional channel, manufacturer

at first. Then, retailer

product manufacturers, a

will sell and delivery part of products

will sell the products to demand markets in the end and provide

additional retail service for customers using traditional channel. In this scenario, according to consumer
preference between selling price, time and retail service, there are two options for consumers to select: direct
channel and traditional channel.
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Consider a general network with time attribute
network,

denotes the set of directed links and

links between node

and node

links between node
node

and node

, where

denotes the set of nodes in the

denotes the set of operation time on directed links. The

can be production and transaction from manufacturer

and node

can be the transaction from retailer

to market

can be the production and transaction from manufacturer
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. The
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Figure 2. A typical dual-channel SCN structure.

In this paper, we assume the process of production, transportation and marketing is assumed to be acyclic.
We suppose that the firms in SC compete and cooperate in a selling season. Different from the definition of a
general operation time on links directly, similar to that in[21], we divide the operation time in dual-channel SC
into 3 types, (
(

) according to customer preference and product characteristics. The operation time

) between manufacturers and retailers includes production time, storage time and delivery time so on. The

operation time (

) between retailers and demand markets includes storage time and delivery time so on. The

operation time (

) between manufacturers and demand markets includes production time, storage time and

delivery time so on. Operation time in dual-channel SC is a key factor that customers care. For example, In a
fashion clothing or a book dual-channel SCN, customers balance between
products dual-channel SCN, customers trade-off between

and

and

. In a customized

. Usually the operation time

between a manufacturer and a marketplace is easy for consumers to get from the external packing of part
products in supermarkets or to percept after making an order.
Definition I: The variational inequality problem
The variational inequality problem. The finite-dimensional variational inequality problem,
determine a vector,

, is to

, such that
(1)

Where

is the feasible set of chain variables for the SCN in

our model.

is a given continuous function from

the inner product in n dimensional Euclidean space.

to

,

is a given closed convex set, and

denotes

is a network economic equilibrium if and only if

[22]

satisfies (1)

.

2.1 The equilibrium conditions for manufacturers
The transaction between manufacturer

and retailer

is a solid arrow line in Fig. 2. The transaction
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is denoted by dotted arrow lines in Fig. 2. The production

satisfies the conservation of product flow equation (2). The production output of

is equal to the sum of the quantities sent from manufacturer

to all retailers and all customers

through all delivery methods. Here we assume that each manufacturer has a production cost function

.

=

(2)
(3)

The transaction cost between manufacturer
manufacturer

and consumers in market

and retailer

, as well as the transaction cost between

, include the transportation cost and insurance cost which depends

on the volume of product flow between the two nodes. The transaction costs are given by:
(4)
The operation time

between manufacturer

and retailer

, including production time and

transportation time are related to the relevant transaction cost. In our model, manufacturer

provides

operation time options associated with different cost functions.
(5)
Every manufacturer goes for profit maximization. So, the profit of manufacturer
that manufacturer

is equal to the price

charges for the product multiplied by the volume of product shipping to all retailers,

with the addition of the price

that manufacturer

charges for the products multiplied by the volume of

product shipping to all consumers in markets, minus the production cost and transaction cost. The function of
profit maximization for manufacturer

can be expressed as:

max

(6)
(7)

2.2 The equilibrium conditions for retailers
The transaction cost between retailer

and customers in market

may include transportation, display,

and storage costs associated with these products. There is only a delivery way between retailers and customers
in markets, which is a solid arrow line in Figure 2. Let
function and retail service cost between retailers
is a function of retail service

and

respectively denote a transaction cost

and customers in market

.

is a function of

and

. The transaction cost function and retail service cost function, then, can

be expressed as:
(8)
(9)
The operation time

between retailers

and customers in market

is related to the relevant

transaction cost, too. Assuming that every retailer is a profit-maximizer, the profit of retailer
price

that retailer

is equal to the

charges for the products multiplied by the volume of the products shipping to all

customers, minus the transaction cost and retail service cost. The function of profit maximization for retailer
can be expressed as:
max

(10)
(11)
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2.3 The behavior of consumers in markets
Suppose that there are

products in dual-channel SCN. Let

. We assume that the prices of all market
[23]

changed the way to obtain price information
retailer

denote the price of product

on market

are transparent for all consumers, because the Internet has
. In point of price, the consumers take the price charged by a

, or the price charged by a manufacturer

, into consideration. The price will not exceed the price

that the consumers in markets are willing to pay for the product. The equilibrium conditions in markets take the
following forms:
For all manufacturers
(12a)

＝
For all retailers

(12b)

＝

Customers in our model are assumed to be heterogeneous. Some consumers care more about operation time
or retail service of goods than price, others vice versa. Suppose that customers are statistically identical and
independent. In our study, we view the same product with distinctive characteristics attribute as variants. Let
denote the probability of the consumers choosing variant
choose variant

is a linear random utility model (LRUM)

[24]

The utility function that customers

.
(13)

is the product’s characteristics attributes vector, including consumer’s valuation, selling price,

Where

operation time and retail service of variant, denoted respectively by

. In this expression

idiosyncratic taste differences of consumers and uncertainty which cannot be observed.

is called
are i.i.d. and

follow a double exponential distribution with mean zero. The exponential, the double exponential and the
Gumbel distributions were verified well to satisfy the requirements[25],[26].
Let

(

) denote the customer’s sensitivity coefficients that are nonnegative absolutely continuous

random variables expressing the consumer’s preference[24], including price sensitivity coefficient, time
sensitivity coefficient and retail service sensitivity coefficient computed by using maximum-likelihood
estimation (MLE), respectively. The probability of choosing alternative (

) out of a total alternative of is:
(14)

The probability of a consumer rejecting all variants options is
to customer choices in

. If

are estimated according

variants, the likelihood ( ) is given as
,

Then we solve the optimal

for

which maximizes

(15)
.

If the equilibrium price the consumers are willing to pay is positive, the shipments from retailers and
manufacturers must be equal to the demand for the products of consumers.

(16)
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2.4 The equilibrium conditions of the dual-channel SCN
The manufacturers and retailers are assumed to compete in a noncooperative fashion. It is also assumed
that the production cost functions and the transaction cost functions for each manufacturer and retailer are
continuous and convex. The optimization function (6) for all manufacturers, the optimization function (10)
subject to (11) for all retailers and functions (12), (16) can be expressed as the following variational
inequality[26],[28]-[31].[29],[30],[31].

.
The term

is the Lagrange multiplier associated with constraint (11) for retailer

Lagrange multiplier for customers in market

. The term

(17)
is the

. The production quantity and shipments that the manufacturers

send to the retailers must be equal to the production quantity and shipments that the retailers accept from the
manufacturers. The amount of product purchased by the customers must be equal to the shipments that the
customers accept from the retailers and manufacturers. We state the equilibrium conditions of the whole
dual-channel SCN as a variational inequality formulation.
3. ALGORITHM AND NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
In this section, the algorithm that we use for the computation of the product equilibrium pattern satisfying
variational inequality (17) is the Projection Method[32],[31]. Then we present one example of dual-channel SCN in
disparate geographic areas, specifically, SCN for shoes.
The example is developed for shoes dual-channel SCN. There are two retailers in two markets who
purchase shoes shipped from two manufacturers. Two manufacturers ship shoes to these retailers and customers
in two demand markets, in which the populations are

10000, respectively (Figure 3). The two

manufacturers are designed to offer two different strategies to satisfy heterogeneous customers with different
requirements: online direct channel and traditional retail channel.

1

1 Manufacturers

tmn

tmk

1

2

Retailers

tnk
1

2 1

1

2 2

Markets

Figure 3. The shoe SCN structure.

The relative data of example are given in table 1. The retailer service cost function is given:
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. The algorithm is implemented in MATLAB R2017a (step length

precision

,

, convergence

).
Table 1. Cost functions and time required in this shoes dual-channel SCN.
SC 1

SC 2

Time

Cost

Time

Cost

Considering 2 different cases, we respectively generate the sales record of 400 heterogeneous customers to
estimate the consumer’s valuation,
retail service sensitivity coefficient

, price sensitivity coefficient

, time sensitivity coefficient

and

for each demand market. We test 2 cases where the customers are

heterogeneous follow the under distributions. Each case has a special consumer’s valuation, or high price
sensitivity or high retail service sensitivity.
Case 1: The customers are heterogeneous in
and

,

and

, i.e.,

,

,

.

Case 2: The customers are heterogeneous in
and

,

and

, i.e.,

,

,

.

These two cases are used to simulate the implement of our dual-channel network equilibrium model when
the firms face heterogeneous customers in practice. At first, we use the method introduced in section 2.3 to
estimate consumer’s valuation, price sensitivity coefficient, time sensitivity coefficient and retail service
sensitivity coefficient. The coefficients that we estimated using MLE are shown in table 2. Then, we use the
coefficients in table 2 to compute the equilibrium flow and price for each case.
Table 2.
Coefficient

estimated by MLE with MNL.

Demand market
1

0.9892

0.0516

0.0494

0.0494

2

0.9876

0.0513

0.0482

0.0482

1

0.9779

0.0534

0.0479

0.0679

2

0.9859

0.0524

0.0492

0.0692

Case 1

Case 2

For the network and cost structure of the shoes dual-channel SCN given above, assume that the utility function
at markets,

. Then, the equilibrium is computed in table 3.
Table 3. Computed equilibrium values on links (

,

).

Results

Case 1 5522.0 6482.6 2015.8 576.5 1055.3 2356.2 1464.8 1464.8 1535.5 1535.5 24.0 24.7 24.2 24.9 39

39

39

39

Case 2 5346.1 6655.6 2188.2 224.0 878.7 2710.0 1467.0 1467.0 1533.4 1533.4 35.8 36.9 36.7 37.8 42

42

42

42

The Seventeenth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business－E-business strategy with data driven

497

4. CONCLUSIONS
Dual-channel SCN is facing many problems such as low logistics efficiency, long transportation time and
channel conflict. All these problems are required to be solved by a systematic and intelligent network

[34]

. The

tool and method of designing and managing effective dual-channel SCN would be beneficial to firms and
consumers in dual-channel SCN. In this paper, a dual-channel SCN equilibrium model with customer-driven
was developed considering heterogeneous consumer characteristic attributes, which is comprised of multiple
product manufacturers, retailers and customers in competing markets. We began by considering operation time
on links associated with different transaction cost and retail service. Next, a discrete choice model was designed
to illustrate the customer choice from consumer-driven perspective in competing markets where the consumers
make decisions among selling price, operation time and retail service according to their characteristic attributes.
Furthermore, a finite-dimensional variational inequality was adopted to formulate the dual-channel SCN
equilibrium conditions. Finally, a numerical example was provided to illustrate the model and the computational
procedure.
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